ABSTRACT Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a cryptographic primitive to hide memory access pattern in untrusted storage, but the cost remains prohibitively expensive. This paper proposes cycle ORAM, an improvement of Ring ORAM for small client setting. It gains the most efficient bandwidth and client storage simultaneously. In the eviction, Cycle ORAM is the first scheme which does not need to evict all buckets in the target path. Instead, it only evicts the root bucket. Moreover, to preserve the stash size, the root bucket is expected to provide the largest empty storage by cycling shifting buckets in the server. On the other hand, to meet the security requirement, the randomness of blocks is carried out in the process of bucket reshuffle. Comparing to Ring ORAM, the simulation shows that stash size is smaller and the amortized bandwidth is 1.5× better. In addition, the size of buffer required in ORAM refreshment is reduced from O(logN ) to almost a constant, where N is the number of distinct data blocks in the server.
I. INTRODUCTION
Applications like secure computation in the random access machine (RAM) model e.g., multi-party computation (MPC) [1] or secure processor [2] , require to hide access pattern on the remote data. Besides, with the advent of cloud computing, hiding access pattern on the remote data is also necessary if the data themselves are sensitive, e.g., emails or personal health information, otherwise the privacy of data could be leaked by attacking the access pattern [3] .
Oblivious RAM (ORAM), initially proposed by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [4] , is a cryptographic primitive protection of access pattern in the untrusted storage. ORAM is set in client-server scenario, where the client is totally trusted but the server is untrusted which is treated as honest but curious generally. ORAM translates an access from the client into a group of accesses. The server or other adversaries only observe the group of physical locations, but it is impossible for them to learn anything about the true (logical) location.
Besides group accesses, to preserve the ability of hiding access pattern, ORAM needs to be refreshed by continuously evicting (or reshuffling) and re-encrypting the data reside in
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Zheng Yan. the server. Therefore, how to mitigate its high cost is the main goal in previous researches. Metrics to measure the performance of ORAM include client storage, server storage and bandwidth. Client storage is a secure storage required in the client side, mainly contains position map and stash. Server storage is the total storage required in the server side. Bandwidth is the number of data blocks transferred between the server and client.
The principle of design an ORAM scheme is to improve the performance of its bandwidth [5] - [8] , since it's the bottleneck of response. The method to improve bandwidth depends on whether the client can provide either large storage (GigaBytes or larger) or small storage (MegaBytes or lower). Large client setting is usually used in remote oblivious file system. An outstanding ORAM scheme is SSS [7] , with GigaBytes of client storage, the bandwidth achieves ∼1 · logN .
However, if the client is a mobile phone in remote oblivious file system, or the scenario is secure processor, client storage becomes very scarce. Path ORAM [9] is a tree-based scheme which gains a KiloBytes to MegaBytes client storage with c · logN bandwidth, where c is a constant. Even though, it is still a challenge to implement it in small client setting, e.g., secure processor. Phantom [2] shows it requires the use of multiple FPGA just to store the position map in Path ORAM. The number of items in the position map scales linearly with the number of data blocks in the ORAM. To solve this problem, the idea is to store the position map in an additional ORAM [5] , which is called Recursive ORAM. In this case, the occupancy of position map is reduced at the cost of increasing bandwidth. Even after architectural optimizations, Recursive ORAM also spends 39% to 56% to look up position map ORAMs [10] , and this percentage increases with ORAM capacity.
The way of bandwidth improvment is various, such as server computation [11] - [13] and adding trusted hardware in the server side [14] , [15] . As a special case, ORAM scheme is re-designed based on hardware in secure processor [16] , [17] . In this paper, we design a basic scheme with simple computation in the server side, e.g., XOR. Other ways of improvement might be combined with the basic scheme simply.
As a basic scheme, Ring ORAM [11] is an improvement of Path ORAM in which bandwidth is independent of bucket size. A problem in Ring ORAM is that stash size can not be preserved very well while the bandwidth improves. In addition, it requires an extra buffer in the client side at every eviction, Furthermore, the buffer is even larger than the stash size. Refer to [18] , block size in the outsourced file system ranges from KiloBytes to MegaBytes. Due to the stash size and the buffer required in ORAM refreshment, it is a challenge to carry out in small client setting.
To improve the performance of bandwidth and client storage simultaneously, we propose a new scheme named Cycle ORAM. Besides XOR, we prolong the lifetime of blocks in the server side and enlarge the probability to write blocks out to server while refreshment. Performance comparison with Ring ORAM and Path ORAM is listed in table 1. Specifically, bandwidth in Ring ORAM and Cycle ORAM are handled by XOR in the server side. The main contributions in Cycle ORAM are summarized as follows.
• Lower amortized bandwidth. Instead of the entire path, only the root node is evicted at a fixed rate. Compare to Ring ORAM, the overall amortized bandwidth is 1.5× better.
• More precise evaluation on client storage. Besides the blocks which have not written out to the server, i.e., stash, we also count the buffer required in the ORAM refreshment which can not be ignored due to the fixed rate of eviction or reshuffle.
• Smaller client storage. The stash is bounded better than Ring ORAM. Besides, path eviction is almost replaced with bucket reshuffle while refreshing. Due to its mechanism, the buffer required in refreshment is reduced from the enire path just to three buckets(from O(logN ) to constant 3).
• Tight asymptotical analysis. We give the asymptotical analysis of stash size and bandwidth. Simulation shows that the asymptotical analysis is tight.
In addition, Boneh et al. [19] pointe out that the client request is blocked while reshuffle or eviction. Cycle ORAM does not needs to evict the entire path, and this issue is mitigated. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the related work. Section 3 describes the background and gives an introduction about Ring ORAM. Section 4 gives the main techniques in Cycle ORAM. Section 5 explains the detail of Cycle ORAM. Section 6 bounds and simulates the stash size in Cycle ORAM. Section 7 analyzes and simulates the bandwidth in Cycle ORAM. Section 8 claims Cycle ORAM's security. Section 9 gives a conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
Over the past three decades, many researches focus on how to improve the performance of ORAM [5] , [7] - [9] , [11] - [13] , [20] - [26] . Data structure of ORAM has been developed from hierarchical hash table to binary tree and the performance improves dramatically. Up to now, the amortized bandwidth could gains O(logN ) both in small client setting and large client setting. As we mentioned before, SSS [7] is the representative scheme for large client setting with ∼ 1 · logN bandwidth, Path ORAM [9] is the representative scheme for small client setting with c · logN bandwidth.
A. SERVER SIDE COMPUTATION
To speed up the response, the server is extended from a passive responder to a data manipulator as the client does, and the performance of bandwidth has been significantly improved. Based on this idea, online bandwidth is proposed to indicate the response time in practice. Ring ORAM [11] and Burst ORAM [13] carry out simple XOR operation in the server side and obtain O(1) online bandwidth. Based on Ring ORAM, DivORAM uses variable-length block and saves 30% bandwidth compared to Ring ORAM. Later, the server is endowed with much more complex computation ability such as FHE. Onion ORAM [12] uses AHE and gains a constant bandwidth both for the online and amortized. Moreover, its stash size is also a constant.
B. SERVER SIDE TRUSTED HARDWARE
Wang et al. [27] propose a hard-ware based PIR scheme which gains O(1) online bandwidth and O(N /k) amortized bandwidth, where k is the number of access in a session. Williams and Sion [28] use a secure coprocessor in the server side, and it obtains O(logN ) 2 amortized bandwidth in hierarchical structure. Resorting to PIR and FHE, Path-PIR ORAM [29] gains O(logN ) amortized bandwidth with a constant stash size. Abraham et al. [14] combine d-ary tree and PIR, and it obtains O(log d N ) blowup of bandwidth. VOLUME 7, 2019 ZeroTrace [15] imposes SGX in ORAM, by maintaining a logarithmic bandwidth between the eclave code in SGX and server disks, it saves most of bandwidth between the server and client.
C. APPLICATION AREAS
After the proposal of Path ORAM for small client setting, ORAM is implemented in secure processor, such important work is Phantom [2] . Later, several follow-up works appear to improve the bandwidth or solve the property of scarce storage on-chip memory in terms of hardware design [16] , [17] , [30] . In addition, MPC is deveploed based on ORAM, e.g., the private database access which needs to preserve the data from both server and client [1] . Gordon first uses ORAM to design the MPC protocol for two parties [31] . SCORAM [32] and Circuit ORAM [8] improve the Path ORAM and mitigate the complex computation in the client side. Zahur et al. [33] use the original square-root ORAM and produce a smaller concrete circuit size.
III. BACKGROUND
This section provides security definition of ORAM. Furthermore, Ring ORAM is introduced.
A. SECURITY DEFINITION
In ORAM, data are divided into blocks which have the same size. An ORAM scheme is qualified as secure if it hides the following information from server: 1) which blocks are being accessed; 2) when the blocks were last accessed; 3) whether a block or sequence has been accessed before (linkage); 4) access pattern (sequential or random); 5) operation type(read or write).
To hide the above information, there is a basic requirement for the client, i.e., it needs to support probabilistic encryption. Once a block is retrieved from the server, the client carries out probabilistic encryption to cut off the mapping between plaintext and ciphertext of the block.
Refer to [7] , security definition of ORAM is as follows. Let
denotes the access sequence from the client, in which index M represents the latest access. Parameter op i denotes the type of operation in i-th access. If the operation is write, data is replaced with parameter data i . Parameter id i denotes the index of the block. Let ORAM (y) denotes the result of sequence y after the ORAM's translation. For other request sequences with the same length, e.g., y , the server can not computationally distinguish ORAM (y) and ORAM (y ). In addition, ORAM (y) is consistent with y in an overwhelming probability.
B. RING ORAM
We introduce Ring ORAM from three aspects, data structure, operations and challenges. Table 2 lists the related symbols. 
1) DATA STRUCTURE
Data structure in the server side is a binary tree. Each node in the tree contains a bucket, and each bucket is composed of number of Z + S slots. Blocks are actually stored in these slots, one slot for one block. There are two types of block, real and dummy. As well, a bucket also contains some metadata, e.g., the offset of real block.
There are three kinds of data structures in client side, stash, position map and key related information. Stash stores the blocks which have not been written out to server yet. It is a key-value dictionary and each item is formed as {idx : data}, where idx is the index of the real block and data is the payload of the block. The position map is also a key-value dictionary and each item is formed as {idx : l}, where idx is identical to above and l is the mapped path of the block. The key related information contains keys used in encryption.
2) OPERATIONS
Tree-based ORAM has three operations, Read&Remove, AddStash and Eviction&Reshuffle.
a: READ&REMOVE
When the client wants to access a block, it looks for the position map to find the path mapped by the block. After that, it traverses the path and reads a block in each bucket. Except for the target block, other blocks are all dummy. The offset in each bucket is determined by the metadata.
b: AddStash
The block read out from the server in Read operation is added into stash. Besides, when eviction or reshuffle happens, the blocks in the eviction path or reshuffle bucket are also added into stash.
c: EVICTION&RESHUFFLE
Eviction in Ring ORAM is carried out by PathEvict and Reshuffle is carried out by BucketReshuffle. According to the Reverse-lexicographic order [34] , PathEvict chooses a path to evict at every A accesses. All the buckets along the path are read out in a secure fashion. Then, buckets from leaf to root are greedily filled with blocks from the stash, ensuring that blocks get pushed as deep down into the tree as possible. If the counter of a bucket is up to S, then reshuffle the bucket by BucketReshuffle. The read and write process are the same with PathEvict.
When read a bucket, the secure fashion means to hide whether real blocks in it have been accessed before. Suppose the number of valid real blocks(never been accessed before) is z. Then number of Z blocks is read out which contains all the z valid real blocks and Z − z valid dummy blocks.
After read, blocks in stash are written out to the bucket. The rule of choosing blocks in stash is as follows. For a certain bucket, if the path mapped by a block contains the bucket, then the block can reside in it. No matter how many blocks satisfy the rule, only Z blocks are randomly chosen (if less than Z , choose all of them). In the end, these blocks are randomly permuted with dummy blocks to construct a list with the size Z + S. In the end, the list is written out with metadata.
3) CHALLENGES
We summarize the challenges in Ring ORAM according to the performance of bandwidth and client storage.
First, if the server carries out XOR operation, the bandwidth in Ring ORAM reaches to 4.5 · logN when Z = 4. But in large client setting, the most efficient bandwidth provided by SSS is ∼1 · logN . Although Ring ORAM provides 2.5
· logN when Z = 50, the bucket size is enlarged to a few hundred. This brings two shortcomings. One is that the stash size is enlarged, e.g., when Z = 32, the stash size is 113 (with security parameter equals 80). The other is that large bucket size impacts the response time in practice. Bandwidth in PathEvict or even BucketReshuffle would be enlarged to a few hundred and the response time would be severely delayed.
Second, Ring ORAM contains a buffer to store the blocks retrieved by PathEvict and the value is about Z · logN . We have mentioned that, to obtain a better bandwidth, the bucket size needs to be enlarged, and the buffer is enlarged too. Moreover, it requires the client to provide such storage at a fixed rate, i.e., at every A accesses. The two properties are beyond the capability of small clients, such as secure processor or mobile phone in outsourced file system.
IV. MAIN TECHNIQUES
We first analyze how Ring ORAM improves its performance. Compare to Path ORAM, Ring ORAM prolongs the lifetime of block in the server and gets a better bandwidth. On the other hand, due to the Reverse-lexicographic order in eviction, the probability of writing blocks out to server increases, and the stash size becomes smaller than Path ORAM.
The way to improve the performance of bandwidth in Cycle ORAM is similar with Ring ORAM. Recall the eviction in Ring ORAM, we observe that buckets in the path might not have been accessed S times due to the fixed eviction rate. Hence, the lifetime of bucket in Ring ORAM could be prolonged until it has been accessed S times. To perserve the stash size, the buckets in eviction are expected to provide larger storage than the one in Ring ORAM. On the other hand, to preseve the buffer size, the number of bucket involved in eviction should be cut down as much as possible. The main techniques are summarized as follows.
A. CYCLICALSHIFT&ROOTEVICT
The PathEvict in Ring ORAM is divided into two stages, CyclicalShift and RootEvict. In a high level, CyclicalShift is used to prolong the lifetime and provide larger storage for RootEvict. And RootEvict is used to write out blocks from stash. CyclicalShift and RootEvict are executed one after another at every A accesses.
Specifically, CyclicalShift is executed by the server to shift the bucket on the eviction path from root to leaf. After shift, all the buckets are lifted up by a level and the bucket in leaf is shifted to the root cyclically, which is the bucket expected to provide the largest storage for the blocks in stash. RootEvict is executed after CyclicalShift. Instead of an entire path, only the bucket in root node is evicted. In this case, the lifetime for all the buckets is prolonged to 2 L+1 A accesses.
B. POINTER TREE
To eliminate the cost caused by buckets movement in CyclicalShift, we introduce a data structure named pointer tree. It is actually a binary tree in the server side. Each node in pointer tree contains the pointer of a bucket, and all the buckets are stored as a list in the server side. In CyclicalShift, instead of cyclically shifting the buckets directly, only the pointers of them are shifted.
C. RANDOMIZE IN BUCKETRESHUFFLE
Due to RootEvict and CyclicalShift, the buckets are evicted one after another. Hence, the blocks accessed before are written out sequentially in a bucket or the buckets which follow the Reverse-lexicographic order approximately in each level. In other words, blocks do not randomly reside in the server. Once a sequential access sequence comes again, the server has an overwhelming probability to obtain the linkage by observing positions of the buckets been accessed.
To solve this problem, we randomize the blocks in BucketReshuffle. Traditionally, BucketReshuffle only happens along a path. However, it can not break the Reverselexicographic order very well. Hence, we also execute BucketReshuffle at a fixed rate and reshuffle blocks among different paths as much as possible.
V. CYCLE ORAM
In this section, we describe Cycle ORAM in detail in terms of the data structure and access protocol.
A. DATA STRUCTURE
The data structure in Cycle ORAM is illustrated in figure 1 . In the server side, it consists of two main data structures, the pointer tree storing the pointer to each bucket and the bucket list storing the payload of the buckets. The pointer tree is initialized with the indices of the bucket list. According to the BFS algorithm, the nodes in pointer tree are filled with the indices of the bucket list one by one, e.g., the root node is filled with index 0, and its children are filled with index 1 and 2 respectively, and so on. We treat the bucket is under the same level with its pointer logically, e.g., in figure 1 , we say bucket 0 is in level 0 and bucket 1 is in level 1.
In the client side, it mainly contains three data structures, stash, buffer and position map (the client also contains key information which is the same with previous scheme). The stash contains the blocks have not been written out. The buffer stores the blocks in eviction or reshuffle. In position map, item in it indicates the position of a block with the form {idx : (l, ord)}, where idx is the index of the block, (l, ord) is the position of the node in pointer tree which points the bucket block idx resides in. Specifically, l is the level of the node and ord is the order of the node in level l (from left to right). With the new form, we can easily update l and ord to indicate the destination after CyclicalShift.
B. ACCESS PROTOCOL
Access protocol in Cycle ORAM is illustrated in Algorithm 1. We add a notation w to indicate the rate of BucketReshuffle. There are two persistent variables, round and paths, which is used to trigger PathEvict and BucketReshuffle. Moreover, paths stores the set of path involved in BucketReshuffle. First, the client looks for the position map to get the block's position. Then it reads the block by function ReadPath. If the operation is read, it returns the block directly, or else the payload of block is updated by parameter data . The block read out is added into stash. In the end, refreshment operations such as the eviction and reshuffle are executed to write blocks out according to the two above variables.
1) READPATH
Remark that position map in Cycle ORAM only stores the position of node which contains the target bucket's pointer. We randomly choose a path in the pointer tree which goes through the node as the target in ReadPath. The remaining process is almost the same with Ring ORAM. The client first reads the metadata in the buckets along the target path and gets the offsets of the target block or valid dummy block. Besides the target block, others blocks been read out are all dummy. Once a block has been accessed, the corresponding slot is invalidated to prevent from being accessed Figure 1 gives an example when the target path is '000'. According to pointers in the path, bucket 0, bucket 1 and bucket 3 are accessed. For each bucket, block in the gray slot is read out and the slot is invalidated immediately. In the end, counters of the three buckets are increased by 1.
2) PATHEVICT
PathEvict is executed at every A accesses. Meanwhile, the target path is chosen according to Reverse-lexicographic order. The process of PathEvict is shown in Alogrithm 2. For simplicity, we use the form BP(l, i) to represent the bucket pointed by node P(l, i).
First, CyclicalShift to the pointer tree is executed by the server. It shifts the pointer in each node to the next level from root to leaf cyclically. Figure 2 gives an example of CyclicalShift. Afterwards, the position map is updated. For a certain block, its position is updated to the node in the next higher level along the path.
Second, RootEvict is executed by the client. The bucket pointed by root node is found first. Then ReadBucket is invoked. All the z blocks which have never been accessed before are read out in a secure fashion and stored in the buffer. Afterwards, WriteBucket is invoked to write blocks out. The process of WriteBucket are defined as follows. First, the z blocks stored in buffer are prepared to be written out. Second, number of Z − z blocks are expected to be chosen from stash to fulfill the bucket. In RootEvict, since the eviction object is the root bucket, all blocks in stash could be chosen as a candidate for the bucket. In the end, the real blocks chosen from the candidates are randomly permuted with dummy blocks to be written out. After writing, positions of these blocks are updated to (0, 0). Detail of ReadBucket and WriteBucket could refer to appendix A.
3) BUCKETRESHUFFLE
BucketReshuffle is executed at every w accesses. In the w paths accessed before, once the counter of a bucket reaches S, the bucket is reshuffled in BucketReshuffle. To achieve randomness, blocks should be reshuffled to other paths as much as possible. Recall that Onion ORAM reshuffles a bucket to its children. Here we leverage and extend this idea. Since buckets in BucketReshuffle are scattered, the children of the bucket been reshuffled might not involve in. We extend to reshuffle the bucket to other buckets as long as they are on the left side or right side, which might be the descendant, sibling or sibling's descendant. To reshuffle both to the left side and right side, we define the capability of buffer is 3. In addition, parameter w impacts the randomness of blocks and we will discuss how to choose it in the section of security analysis.
The process of BucketReshuffle is showed in Algorithm 3. First, we traverse buckets in the w paths by their RootEvict order. If the counter of a bucket is S, then the bucket is read out into buffer by function ReadBucket. Once number of 3 buckets has been read out, the first read out bucket is reshuffled to the other two buckets by function Reshuffle.Afterwards, another bucket is read out and the second read out bucket is reshuffled to the other two buckets, and so on. Specifically, during w accesses, if the counter of a bucket is already S and it needs to be accessed again, the bucket is reshuffled immediately. If there are buckets which are root evicted later and also needs to be reshuffled, then reshuffle them with the same way mentioned above. The process of ReadBucket is identical with the one in RootEvict and we describe Reshuffle mainly. The principle in Reshuffle is that all the blocks should be uniformly randomized and we invoke Randomize to handle it. We call the bucket going to be reshuffled is the source bucket and the destination is found in the other two buckets. If the two buckets are in the different side, then both of them are destinations. If they are on the same side, then the one in the lower level is the destination or both of them are the destinations if they are in the same level.
Afterwards, the process Randomize is executed with the rules defined as follows. If the destination is in the same level, we permute all the blocks in the source bucket and destination bucket randomly. Otherwise we traverse and permute the block in the source bucket by a random one in destination bucket with the probability of 2 − , where is the difference of level between source bucket and destination bucket. Figure 3 gives an example about the Reshuffle when Z = 4. Bucket 0, bucket 4 and bucket 2 are involved in BucketReshuffle. All the three buckets are retrieved from the server and bucket 0 is reshuffled firstly. Both bucket 4 and bucket 2 are the right descendants (no left descendants exist). In bucket 0, block a is permuted by block c in bucket 2 and block b is permuted by block d in bucket 4.
In the end, the process WriteBucket is invoked to write blocks out. Besides the buffer, it also try to write out blocks from stash. The way to choose blocks in stash relies on the position of the bucket. If the bucket is in level l, the probability of blocks in stash could be chosen as a candidate is 2 −l . Suppose the number of real blocks retrieved in ReadBucket is z, we randomly choose number of Z − z blocks from the candidates if it is sufficient, otherwise, all the candidates are chosen. More details could be found in appendix A.
VI. BOUND STASH
It is clarity that the buffer required in BucketReshuffle is 3Z . Hence, we focus on the stash caused by the blocks have not been written out yet. In Cycle ORAM, stash is mainly caused by PathEvict and we analyze it strictly in theory. On the other hand, BucketReshuffle has a subtle impact and we analyze it heuristically.
A. ASYMPTOTICAL ANALYSIS
In RootEvict, if the number of valid real block in the root bucket is more than Z − A, then there is not enough storage for the blocks retrieved in previous A accesses. The extra blocks are stored in stash. Note that the buckets in the server are evicted one after another. Hence, we can treat them as a sequence ordered by the time of RootEvict. Lemma 1 describes the relationship between the sequence and the stash size. Proof is given in appendix B.
Lemma 1: There is only one sub sequence T which generates the biggest size stash R.
Suppose X 1 , X 2 , ..., X N are number of N random variables such that X i ∈ {0,1}, X i = 1 indicates that real block i is still valid until the bucket it resides in is root evicted. By Lemma 1, we have formula (1), where n(Stash) is the size of stash, n(T ) is the length of T .
Pr[n(Stash)
Whether a real block is valid or not depends on the random access pattern. Hence, as long as blocks are randomly distributed (the proof of randomness is given in the following section), X i is independent from each other. Due to the independence, we leverage Chernoff-like inequality to bound the occupancy of valid real block in T . According to Chernofflike inequality, the bound of E[e tX (T ) ] is established first, where t > 0 and
The expected load of valid real blocks in T , i.e., E[X (T )] is analyzed in lemma 2. Proof is given in appendix B.
Lemma 2: The expected load of valid real block in T satisfies E[X (T )]
= n(T ) · Ae −λ · (1 − e −λ ) −1 ,
where λ is the expected number in Poisson distribution and the value is
With the bound of E[e tX (T ) ], we calculate formula (1) by Markova inequality and obtain formula (3), where n(T ) = n,
We set t = ln(d/a) > 0 and get the bound of stash as formula (4) shows. 
B. SIMULATION
We simulate Cycle ORAM with the same setting in Ring ORAM, with logN = 20 for over 1 billion accesses under random access pattern. Furthermore, we spend 2 25 accesses to warm the scheme up and achieve a steady state.
To obtain a good response for a single access, parameter Z is set to a small number. Specifically, we set Z = 4 as Path ORAM does. In addition, parameter A is always set to its maximum. If A is small, the amortized bandwidth becomes large. Based on the condition a < d, we get the condition Z − A > 0. Since Z and A are both integers, the best bandwidth would be obtained when Z − A = 1. In this case, parameter A is set to 3, and the condition in formula (4) is simplified as a < 1. Figure 4 plots two curves for small client setting. It illustrates stash size against the quantity log 2 (1/δ) where δ is the failure probability. The curve represents the relationship between R and δ, i.e., for a certain R in y-axis, the probability that stash exceeds R is δ. To compare with Ring ORAM, we plot the curve when N = 2 L A, corresponding, a = 0.47. On the other hand, to evaluate the utilization of server storage for small client setting, we plot the case when a = 0.9, corresponding, N = 0.68 · 2 L+1 A. When a = 0.47, the curve is almost a linear line, which represents that the probability of stash exceeding R decreases exponentially, i.e., 2 − (R) . When a = 0.9, the curve is sub linear at the tail. This is due to the impact of the other factor e −n[dln(d/a)+a−d] in formula (4), where parameter n in it is linear with the size of stash. When the size increases, the value of this factor decreases. Hence, at the tail of the curve, the probability that stash exceeds R decreases faster than 2 − (R) .
Recall that stash analyzed above only considers the blocks have not been written out. Client storage also contains the buffer required in eviction or reshuffle. Table 3 compares the two parts between Ring ORAM and Cycle ORAM. The stash size is extrapolated for realistic security parameter based on figure 4.
To evaluate how tight the upper bound provided by formula (4), we set a ≈ 1, correspondingly, N ≈ 0.72·2 L+1 A. Figure 5 shows the result. Because of the large stash, at the tail of the curve, the probability that stash exceeds R decreases more significantly than 2 − (R) . For a certain N , when a ≈ 1, the server storage required by our scheme reaches its minimum, i.e., 4N .
Besides N , S also has a subtle impact on the stash size. If S is smaller, the number of buckets involed in BucketReshuffle would be larger and the probability of blocks in stash been written out is higher. Figure 6 illustrates two curves corresponding to S = 6 and S = 10 when a = 0.9.
VII. BANDWIDTH ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
In Cycle ORAM, the amortized bandwidth is composed of three parts, ReadPath, RootEvict and BucketReshuffle. The amortized bandwidth in ReadPath and RootEvict are L + 1 and (2Z + S)/A respectively. Since BucketReshuffle is actually composed by the buckets need to be reshuffled after w accesses, we directly analyze how many buckets need to be reshuffled in a single access to obtain its amortized bandwidth.
Based on the random distribution of blocks, the times that a bucket been accessed until shifted to the upper level could be treated as Poisson distribution with the expected value A. In other words, the expected access times for a bucket in a certain level is A. Hence, the value of its counter is distributed from 0 to S − 1 evenly and the probability that the bucket needs to be reshuffled after an access is 1/S. For the entire path, the number of bucket needs to be reshuffled after an access could also be approximately treated as Poisson distribution with the expected value (L + 1)/S. Clearly, the overall amortized bandwidth is (L + 1) + (2Z + S)/A + (2Z + S) · (L + 1)/S. We simulate the distribution of how many buckets need to be reshuffled in an access during 1 billion random accesses with S = 6 and logN = 20. Figure 7 shows both the analytical and empirical distribution. Now we discuss the impact of parameter S to bandwidth. Figure 8 shows Ring ORAM and Cycle ORAM's bandwidth vs. parameter S. The value is the amortized bandwidth after XOR in ReadPath. Along with the increase of S, Cycle ORAM could get a better bandwidth. However, if S is too large, the server resources are wasted. Fortunately, bandwidth almost achieves the best value when S − Z = 6. In this case, bandwidth achieves 3 · logN , which is 1.5× better that the best value in Ring ORAM.
VIII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We have mentioned that the security of Cycle ORAM depends on whether the blocks are randomly distributed in the server. Furthermore, analysis of stash size and bandwidth are all based on the randomness distribution of blocks. In this section, we first show the blocks could be randomly distributed in BucketReshuffle, then the security of the access protocol is described by referring to Ring ORAM.
A. RANDOMNESS
For an access, we define two events to describe the relationship between access pattern and target bucket. Let G is the event that the bucket in level l is the target and C is the event that, refer to the previous access pattern, this bucket follows Reverse-lexicographic order in level l. The probability that the bucket in level l is the target under the condition of event C could be calculated by Bayes formula, as formula (5) shows. Without randomness, it is easy to find that P(C|G) = 1 (we ignore the randomness of RootEvict). Along with the increase of l, the probability of P(G|C) increases. As long as P(C|G) = P(C) = 2 −l , P(G|C) = 2 −L , and the blocks in the server are randomly distributed.
P(G|C) = P(C|G)P(G) P(C|G)P(G)
Now we analyze whether the relationship between access pattern and target bucket can be eliminated by BucketReshuffle. From the analysis of bandwidth, we have found that the probability that a bucket needs to be reshuffled in each level is 1/S. In other words, the expected number of buckets needs to be reshuffled in an access is (L + 1)/S. If we set w = S, there is a bucket in each level which is expected to be reshuffled in BucketReshuffle. Due to the rule of reshuffle and randomize in BucketReshuffle, the effect of BucketReshuffle is the same with the eviction in Ring ORAM, except that the rate is reduced from A to w, which means the condition P(C|G) = P(C) = 2 −l could be satisfied and P(G|C) = 2 −L eventually. Hence, randomness distribution of blocks in Cycle ORAM could be achieved by BucketReshuffle very well.
B. ACCESS PROTOCOL
In a high level, Cycle ORAM introduces pointer tree as another data structure. Since it only contains the pointer for the position of bucket, and the position is a physical address which can be opened. Hence, operations on the pointer tree never brings any threat. Now we analyze the sub processes in Cycle ORAM, which are ReadPath, PathEvict, and BucketReshuffle. The security is analyzed according to the ORAM's security definition in section 2. Let y is the access sequence of length M , and the server sees ORAM (y) correspondingly.
Claim 1 (ReadPath Leaks no Information:) The server sees ORAM (y) by ReadPath is a sequence (
, where P i [a i ] is the target path generated by block a i in position map in the i-th access. From the above section, the blocks are randomly distributed, therefore, the target path generated according to position map is random. Moreover, once a block has been read out, it would be randomly written out to the server by PathEvict and BucketReshuffle, hence, P i [a i ] is statistically independent of P j [a j ] for j < i with a j = a i . For another accesss sequence y , the probability that the two access pattens are the same is 2 −(L+1)M , which proves that the part of ORAM (y) by ReadPath is computationally indistinguishable from a random sequence of bit strings. More detail, all the blocks been read out are invalidated and the same block would not be accessed twice. While read, the real block and dummy block are both read out. Hence,ReadPath leaks no information.
Claim 2 (PathEvict Leaks no Information):
The server sees ORAM (y) by PathEvict is a sequence (P M /A , P (M −1)/A , · · · , P 1 ), where P i is the path for the i-th eviction.
Since the path been chosen follows Reverse-lexicographic order, the sequence leaks no information. More detail, in CyclicalShift, the pointer tree is the only data structure be handled, hence, no information is leaked from it. In RootEvict, the root bucket is read or written in a secure fashion as Ring ORAM does. Hence, PathEvict leaks no information.
Claim 3 (BucketReshuffle Leaks no Information): The server sees ORAM (y) by BucketReshuffle is a sequence
, where P i [a i ] is the target path generated by block a i in position map in the i-th access. In fact, the sequence in BucketReshuffle is the same with ReadPath. Hence, the probability that two access patterns are the same is 2 −(L+1)M , which proves that the part of ORAM (y) by BucketReshuffle is computationally indistinguishable from a random sequence of bit strings. More detail, while reshuffle, the bucket is read or written in a secure fashion as Ring ORAM does. Hence, BucketReshuffle leaks no information.
IX. CONCLUSION
In Cycle ORAM, instead of the entire path, it only evicts the root bucket to write out blocks from stash at a fixed rate. The other ORAM refreshment is handled by bucket reshuffle. Comparing with path eviction, bucket reshuffle saves unnecessary bandwidth. We shows that bandwidth in Cycle ORAM is 1.5× better than Ring ORAM. Furthermore, the buffer required in client side by path eviction is reduced from ZlogN to 3Z . Meanwhile, because of cyclical shift, the bucket supposed to provide the largest storage for the blocks in stash is exchanged to the root, and the stash size is bounded better than Ring ORAM too. In summary, Cycle ORAM improves the performance of bandwidth and client storage simultaneously. It is more competitive in the small client setting applications.
APPENDIX A
The detail of ReadPath, ReadBucket and WriteBucket is in Algorithm 4. Metadata in bucket includes valids, addrs, and ptrs. Definitions of them are shown in table 4 .
In ReadPath, the offset is obtained by traversing addrs. Once an item in addrs equals the index of target block, then find the corresponding item in ptrs, the value of the item is the real offset of the target real blocks in the bucket. More detail could be found in Ring ORAM. In ReadBucket, the addrs, ptrs, and valids are read out first. Then all the valid real blocks are read out and added into buffer. Valid dummy blocks are read out if the number of valid real blocks is less than Z . In WriteBucket, blocks stored in parameter blocks are chosen to be written out first. If the size of blocks is less than Z , the blocks in stash are written out to the bucket. In addition, the payloads of real blocks and dummy blocks are shuffled by Pseudo Random Permutation(PRP). where m = 2 L+1 − 1. Obviously, once the sum of a sub sequence in (v 1 , v 2 , · · · , v m ), i.e., T , reaches the maximum, then the largest stash is generated by the buckets in this sub sequence.
Proof 
In order to write out all the blocks accessed in the previous A accesses, we define the expected number of valid real block in each RootEvict is no more than Z −A, Otherwise, the stash size can not be bounded. The definition can always hold by adjusting parameter λ. Hence, the number of blocks in this bucket would be b · e −1 + A after RootEvict, and so on. After n times, the expected number of valid real block in a bucket until RootEvict converges 
